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The Constitutional Dilemma of a Person
Predisposed to Criminal Behavior
I.

INTRODUCTION

The basic premise of American criminal jurisprudence is that individuals are capable of controlling their behavior.' The threat of incarceration is intended to be a deterrent to antisocial conduct. State and
federal penal systems are called "correctional institutions"-implying
that a person is incarcerated in order to modify unacceptable behavior.
Criminal laws are drafted with goals of discouraging antisocial conduct,
punishing and reforming the guilty, and protecting society against dangerous individuals. 2 The first two purposes are served only if a person
can respond to negative reinforcement by conducting himself in socially
acceptable ways. Individuals incapable of controlling antisocial behavior are not accounted for in these criminal-law concepts.
Research in physical and social sciences indicates that there may
be people who cannot control antisocial conduct in themselves. Experiments, as yet inconclusive, suggest that the inability to control behavior
may arise from genetic abnormality, imbalanced body chemistry, or
early development. Behavioral sciences may never progress to the stage
at which it will be possible with certainty to tie conduct to specific
physical or social abnormalities. Recent scientific experiments,3 however, indicate that accurate prediction of aberrant behavior is enough
of a possibility to render profitable an examination of the constitutional
problems that may attend society's realization of the ability to diagnose
an individual as potentially violent. This Note, therefore, is based upon
the hypothesis that some antisocial behavior is caused by detectable
physical abnormality rather than by individuals choosing socially unacceptable behavior. The ability to predict undesirable behavior should
accompany this diagnosis of causation. For example, if the presence of
"tarexin," a hypothetical chemical present in the serum of schizophrenics, is found to cause some forms of mental illness, then testing for the
presence of the chemical in all individuals would identify latent schizophrenics. The capacity to predict based on the presence of a chemical
substance could develop prior to the ability to "cure" 4 the defect. Thus
I. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41-51 (1881); Hart, The Ains of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
2. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 1.
3. See notes 6-33 infra and accompanying text.
4. The term "cure" is utilized throughout this Note to signify relief from the malady under

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

the temptation to predict and control dangerous and presently incurable
behavior would be compelling.
Society might react in a number of ways to the identification of
certain individuals as persons who will be likely to act in an unaccept-

able manner and are incapable of behaving otherwise. Assuming the
predisposed conduct is violent, and, therefore a threat to society, the
most obvious societal response would seem to be the imposition of

restrictions designed to maximize the chance of preventing this violent
behavior. Such restrictions could range from compulsory treatment to
continuous surveillance' to incarceration. The societal sanctions would
vary according to the danger involved in the violent conduct, the proba-

bility of its occurrence, the existence of treatment and cure, and the
range of constitutionally permissible restrictions. This Note will examine the kinds of restrictions that seem likely to be imposed, and the
constitutional problems surrounding their use.
For the purposes of this Note, persons predisposed to criminal or
violent behavior because of genetic or chemical abnormalities, or early
environmental factors will be referred to as "criminally predisposed,"
although the term is broad enough to include others, such as persons
suffering from nonphysically caused mental illness and recidivists. After
a brief introduction to several current theories of predisposed behavior,
the constitutional protection available to the restricted person will be
discussed.
A.

The XYY Chromosomal Abnormality

In 1968 and 1969, it was discovered that a number of defendants
convicted of mass murders and perverse sexual acts had a common

chromosomal abornmality-the XYY syndrome.6 Since the public's atdiscussion. Although the term often is inappropriate in discussing mental illness since, for example,
a remedy parallel to the antibiotic treatment of an infection is seldom available, it is helpful in
denoting relief from the particular problem discussed.
5. The possibility of an electronic device capable of controlling behavior implanted in the
brain of a person suffering from an inherited, undesirable tendency is suggested in Gaylin, We Have
the Awful Knowledge To Make Exact Copies of Human Beings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1972, § 6,
pt. I (Magazine), at 12.
6. Although the first report of the existence of the abnormality was published in 1961, it
came to the public's attention first in the Paris trial of Daniel Hugon in 1968 for strangling an
elderly prostitute. The court overruled defense counsel's contention that Hugon was unfit to stand
trial and rejected defendant's insanity plea based on the XYY syndrome. N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,
1968, at I, col. 3: TIME, May 3, 1968, at 41. That same year, Richard Speck, convicted in Chicago
in the 1967 rape, stabbing, and strangulation of 8 nurses was diagnosed as suffering from the XYY
abnormality. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1968, at 43, col. 3; id., May 6, 1969, at 93, col. 5. The syndrome
was not raised as an insanity defense, however, and played no part in his subsequent appeals. At
the end of 1968 Lawrence E. Hannel raised the XYY syndrome as the basis of an insanity defense
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tention is usually focused on the trials of criminals for bizarre offenses,
the revelation that genetic compulsion may have been responsible for
these crimes received an inordinate amount of attention. Thereafter, the
XYY syndrome became a popular subject for research by geneticists
and criminologists. Since 1965, more than 200 articles discussing the
XYY chromosome have been published in medical, legal, and scientific
7
journals.
The XYY syndrome results when a male foetus receives one X and

two Y chromosomes., Although research is far from conclusive, and
often contradictory, 9 various studies have concluded that a person with
an XYY chromosomal complement is more prone to antisocial behavior
than his normal XY counterpart."0
in his trial for the apparently senseless stabbing-murder of his landlady. Although the jury found
Hannel insane within the M'Naghten rule, it was not allowed to consider the XYY abnormality.
Bartholomew & Sutherland, A Defence of Insanity and the Extra Y Chromosome: R v. Hannell,
2 AuST. & N.Z.J. CRIM. 29 (1969). Finally, a New York jury rejected the XYY insanity plea of
Sean Farley, and found him guilty of first-degree murder in the rape and murder of a woman in
an alley near her home. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1969, at 54, col. 6; id., Apr. 24, 1969, at 53, col. 1;
id.. Apr. 30, 1969. at 93, col. 4.
7. Fox, Criminology: The XYY Offender: A Modern Myth?, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 59,
71 (1971).
8. Chromosomes are threads of complex molecules containing material that transmits characteristics from one generation to the next in plants and animals. For a discussion of how the XYY
syndrome develops in the process of fertilization see Burke, The "XYY Syndrome": Genetics,
Behavior and the Law, 46 DENVER L.J. 261, 262-69 (1969); Fox, supra note 7, at 61-62; Money,
Inpulse Aggression, and Sexuality in the XYY Syndrome, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 220, 228-30
(1969); Montagu, Chromosomes and Crime, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1968, at 43, 44-47; Saxe,
Psychiatry. Sociopathy and the XYY Chromosome Syndrome, 6 TULSA L.J. 243, 245-47 (1970);
Sergovitch, Chromosome Aberrations and Criminal Behaviour: A Brief Review, II CRIM. L.Q.
303, 304-07 (1969). Chromosomes provide the blueprint for the growth and development of a
unique human being from the foetus. The female ovum and male sperm each contain 23 chromosomes, and upon uniting, give the fertilized ovum 46 chromosomes, arranged in 23 pairs. One of
the pairs in each cell contains a gene that determines, among other features, the primary sexual
characteristics of the individual. The biologist calls this pair of chromoscomes "XX'" in the female,
"XY" in the male. The primary biological characteristics of masculinity result from the Y chromosome. Thus, it is the sperm of the father that determines whether a child is male or female-the
sex gene in the ovum will always be X, while in the sperm it may be X or Y.
Numerous chromosomal abnormalities may result if the process of matching the sperm's 23
chromosomes with the ovum's 23 chromosomes fails to operate effectively. For example, in the
XXY Klinefelter Syndrome the individual is outwardly male but sterile, somewhat mentally retarded, and suffers from breast enlargement. The deviation occurs in one out of every 400-500 male
births and has been linked with antisocial behavior such as homosexuality and alcoholism. Fox,
supra note 7, at 61: Montagu, supra note 8, at 47. Other possibilities of chromosomal abnormalities
include "XXX eggs (super-females, not always fertile) . . .XOs (outwardly female, but without
ovaries and therefore without eggs), [and] XXXXYs (typically defective mentally) ....
" Valenti,
His Right To Be Normal, SATURDAY REVIEW, Dec. 7, 1968, at 75. Mongolism is a chromosomal
abnormality that arises not from faulty union of sexual chromosomes, but from the "piggy-back"
displacement of one of the pairs of chromosomes. Id.
9. Fox. supra note 7, at 69.
10. E.g., Casey, Blank, Street, Segall, McDougall, McGrath & Skinner, YY Chromosomes
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The XYY individual has been described as a man having "ex-

tremely tall stature, long limbs with strikingly long arm span, facial
acne, mild mental retardation, severe mental illness (including psy-

chosis), and aggressive, antisocial behavior involving a long history of
arrests, frequently beginning at an early age."" Other research has
shown that nearly three percent of the patients confined because of
dangerous criminal propensities had XYY chromosomal makeup, while
the XYY incidence in the population at large is approximately 0.13
percent. 2 Several studies have supported the thesis that the XYY syndrome is causally related to violent behavior, 3 while other experiments
have questioned the syndrome's role in causing undesirable conduct. 4
Nevertheless, the controvery suggests the possibility that further re-

search may reveal a connection between heredity and antisocial conduct.'- The chromosomal complement, as the blueprint from which an
individual develops, may prove that some undesirable conduct is not the
product of free will. One authority who questioned the validity of the

XYY research to date indicates that the importance of continuing research into the XYY syndrome lies in the attempt "to identify the
behavioral correlates of particular genetic defects [as] one of the important first steps towards the ultimate elimination of undesirable traits in
human beings by genetic manipulation. The attainment of this goal,
however frightening it may appear to be, is no fanciful dream; its realization has been seriously predicted for the first decade of the new cenand Antisocial Behavior,2 LANCET 859 (1966); Jacobs, Brunton, Melville, Brittain & McClemont,
Aggressive Behaviour, Mental Sub-normality and the XYY Male, 208 NATURE 1351 (1965);
Jacobs, Price, Court Brown, Brittain & Whatmore, Chromosome Studies on Men in a Maximum
Security Hospital, 31 ANN. HUMAN GENETICS 339 (1968); Telfer, Are Some CriminalsBorn That
Way?, 34 THINK 24 (1968).
II. Telfer, supra note 10, at 26.
12. Jacobs, Price, Court Brown, Brittain & Whatmore, supra note 10.
13. See materials cited note 10 supra.
14. Fox, supra note 7, at 69-72.
15. One author, working under a United States Public Health Service grant, after criticizing
some of the research on the XYY chromosome concluded: "From the point of view of XYY babies
who will grow up to be law-abiding citizens, it is immoral to spread a pseudoscientific rumor that
the XYY karyotype inexorably spells crime and jail sentences. By contrast, it is equally immoral,
from the point of view of XYY boys and men, already victims of behavior beyond their capacity
to control, to spread a pseudoscientific rumor that they are no different from other males and
should be judged accordingly. We are already far beyond the stage of having to wait out the slow
and costly procedure of gathering XYY incidence statistics before being able to unstraddle the
fence. With all due respect to conservative caution, it is already archaic to maintain that: 'no
definite conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between the presence of the XYY chromosome and deviant criminal and/or violent behavior.' We may confidently say that the XYY
karyotype is sometimes related to law-breaking behavior. The relationship is positive and definite,
but not universal or inexorable." Money, supra note 8, at 231. But see National Institute of Mental
Health, Press Release, July 8, 1969.

1973]

CRIMINALLY PREDISPOSED PERSONS

tury and, with the recently reported isolation of a single gene.
prediction may already require updating.""
B.

. .

this

Chemical Basis of Psychosis

Mental health professionals generally operate on the premise that
antisocial conduct is the product of societal forces that can be counteracted by helping an individual to understand the basis of his behavior,
and, with sufficient professional assistance and a willingness to alter his
conduct, act in a socially acceptable manner. 7 Most patients are confined in mental hospitals after violent conduct has branded them dangerous to society.' Their disorders often are exceptionally severe and frequently recurring. Few psychiatrists would deny that if the individuals
had been reached at a sufficiently early age, their subsequent conduct
might have been avoided.
The idea that some violent conduct may result from physical disorders it not new. Indeed, one authority has gone so far as to quip that
no twisted thought occurs in the absence of a twisted molecule. 9 It
seems more likely, however, that neither physical malfunctions nor environmental influences account for all mental illnesses. Nevertheless, the
discovery that some behavior disorders are caused by physiological defects could have a significant impact upon the manner in which society
copes with such problems.
The discovery of physical caution could result in a cure not dependent upon an individual's ability to change his behavior. If a chemical
imbalance affected the nervous system in such a way that the victim was
violence-prone, simply correcting the imbalance might render the dangerous person harmless. If, however, the illness could not be cured, its
victims could be identified by testing for the chemical imbalance. Thus
a person who has never exhibited violent behavior could be identified
as dangerous to society and controlled to minimize his opportunity for
future antisocial conduct.
Several experiments have hypothesized the existence of chemical
factors said to cause certain types of schizophrenia. One study indicates
that fluctuations in the level of the hormone serotonin2 0 in the brain may
Fox, supra note 7, at 62 (citations omitted).
L. BELLAK, SCHIZOPHRENIA 57-61 (1958); J. KATZ, L. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ,
PSYCIIOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND LAW 669-76 (1967).
18. J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 17, at 500.
19. Gerad, Neurophsysiology: Brain and Behavior, in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1620-58 (S. Arieti ed. 1959).
20. Serotonin is the chemical compound 5-hydroxy-tryptamine. L. BELLAK, supra note 17,
at 214.
16.
17.
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cause schizophrenia.2 1 Antagonistic chemical antimetabolities may
cause an increase or decrease in the level of serotonin, resulting in
schizophrenic conduct.2 2 While the evidence is far from conclusive that
a serotonin imbalance causes some form of schizophrenia, the possibility cannot be dismissed. 3
Another hypothesis is that a substance said to be found in the
serum of schizophrenics, "tarexin," causes some forms of the mental
disorder. 24 According to one researcher, the introduction of tarexin into
the bloodstream of volunteers with no history of schizophrenia induced
symptoms associated with schizophrenia.2 5 Other researchers have discounted the experiment with tarexin, and some have questioned whether
2
the substance exists at all. 1
These experiments nevertheless indicate the possibility that some
forms of the most severe and violence-prone mental illnesses may be
caused by physical factors not within the control of its victims. Indeed,
the recent experience with self-induced chemical imbalances such as
LSD and other hallucinogenics that result in behavior similar to that
may cause the
of psychotics, reinforces the idea that physical disorders
2
behavior generally characterized as schizophrenic.
C.

Techniques of Social Science As the Basis for Predicting Violent
Behavior

Social sciences are basically different from physical sciences in that
prediction of a result based upon a confluence of carefully controlled
elements is a characteristic of the latter but not the former. Psychologists, for example, discuss various factors that affect behavior, but are
21. Wooley, Participation of Serotonin in Mental Process, in CHEMICAL CONCEPTS OF
PSYCHOSIS 176-79 (M. Rindel ed. 1958).
22. Id. at 176.
23. Id. at 186, 188.
24. Heath, Leach, Martens, Cohen & Feighy, Metabolic Abnormalities in Schizophrenia,
in CHEMICAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOSIS 223 (M. Rinkel ed. 1958).
25. "Consistently primary or fundamental symptoms appeared. Blocking and thought deprivation developed; all subjects were autistic and complained of depersonalization. They appeared
dazed, with diminished contact to the environment; had a blank look in their eyes; and showed a
lessening of animation in facial expressions." Id. at 225.
26. L. BELLAK, supra note 17, at 48-49; Robins, Smith & Louv, Attempts To Confirm the
Presenceof "Taraxein" in the Blood of Schizophrenic Patients,in TRANSACTIONS OF THE FOURTH
CONFERENCE, JOSIAH MACY, JR., NEUROPHARMACOLOGY FOUNDATION 123 (H. Abramsen ed.
1959).
27. In a paper presented to the American Psychiatric Association, a research team reported
that they had discovered the probable biological cause of schizophrenia to be an enzyme deficiency.
The researchers are conducting further tests to determine the validity of their findings. Nashville
Tennessean, May 7, 1972, § B, at 9. For a discussion of other possible biochemical bases of
psychosis see L. BELLAK, supra note 17, at 88-92.
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loathe to predict that if X occurs, Y will follow. The reason is obvious-too many factors outside the control and observation of the
psychologist, especially the decision-making process of humans, may
interfere with predictability.
Nevertheless, sociological studies of juvenile delinquency have become sophisticated enough that criminologists are now willing to predict
that given X, Y will follow. 2 In studies spanning several decades one
pair of scientists, the Gluecks, has gathered and analyzed detailed data
on juvenile delinquents from date of birth through early childhood.2 9
Their data indicate that physical characteristics and environmental factors are the primary forces that change the normal individual into a
juvenile delinquent." The Gluecks construct "predictive tables," which
utilize interdisciplinary findings to postulate significant characteristics
influencing juvenile behavior; these characteristics are used to determine which individuals will develop into delinquents. Given sufficient
information about the child's early life, he can be typed as potentially
delinquent or nondelinquent. Important factors include paternal discipline, supervision by the mother, affection of the father and the mother
for the child, and the cohesiveness of the family.3' Although characteristics such as "maternal supervision" admittedly are difficult to quantify, the Gluecks indicate that measurement is sufficiently accurate to
32
justify reliance.
Society could use this ability to predict antisocial behavior in several ways. The most obvious use of the information would be to facilitate early treatment with a view to "curing" the antisocial tendencies.
It is possible, however, that a juvenile "on the road" to delinquency
could not be cured. Furthermore, it is likely that treatment would involve an intensive experience, probably requiring institutionalization. 33
28.

See generally S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, DELINQUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS IN

(1968).
29. "From the other data-the social background of the boys, the Rorschach Test, and the
psychiatric findings-it seemed entirely feasible to construct predictive tables that would markedly
differentiate between potential delinquents and potential nondelinquents .
S. GLUECK & E.
GLUECK, UNRAVELLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 259 (1950).
30. Id. at 258-61; S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, supra note 27, at 170.
31. S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, supra note 29, at 260-61.
32. S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, VENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY 1-71 (1964). The Gluecks have
studied thousands of individual cases. One study compared a group of boys, each of whom the
predictive table indicated possessed the characteristics likely to result in delinquency, to a control
group. S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, supra note 27. The authors concluded that a multidisciplinary
analysis of data confirmed that "boys having in their make-up and early home conditioning certain
identifiable traits and factors which marketedly differentiate delinquents from nondelinquents are
very likely to turn out to be delinquents, and a substantial portion of them are likely to continue
their criminal behavior at least into adolescence and early adulthood." Id. at 171.
33. In 1970 a suggestion by a former personal physician of President Richard Nixon, Dr.
PERSPECTIVE
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It is apparent that whatever use is made of the ability to predict violent
behavior, the potential juvenile delinquent probably will suffer restrictions on his freedom before ever having committed a criminal act.
D. Hypothesis
This Note will consider the constitutional protection available to
criminally predisposed persons by using a hypothetical individual in a
hypothetical class. The members of the class-call it class X-will have
been identified as suffering from an abnormality, such as one of the
three described in the preceding sections, that appreciably increases the
probability of each member committing a violent, antisocial act. For
ease of reference, an individual member of class X will be referred to
as "A."
If it is assumed that the likelihood that any human being will
commit a violent act is five percent, the hypothetical class could have a
probability of violence at any point above that figure. There is as yet
no scientifically developed means for determining which individual in
the largest class-human beings-will act in an undesirable manner in
the future; yet it is certain that the probability for any one person is
some figure above zero. Class X members will have been identified as
having a greater probability of violence. Although no individual in that
class will be identifiable as one who will commit a crime, the physical
abnormality will allow an accurate prediction that the probability that
any individual class X member will act violently is, for example, 25
percent rather than the normal five percent. Once class X has been
scientifically identified as existing, society's reaction34 to the increased
danger posed by members of that class will have to be measured against
existing constitutional limitations.
II.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

The State's Power To Obtain Evidence of Membership in Class X
If society decided to react to protect itself against the increased

Arnold Hutschnecher, erupted into public view when it was revealed that the physician had proposed that psychological tests be administered to all 6-year old children to detect future criminal
tendencies. President Nixon referred the matter, including a plan to confine "hard core" children
in camps for rehabilitation, to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Washington Post, Apr. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 3. In his 1600-word memorandum Dr. Hutschnecher suggested
the use of techniques like the Rorschach ink-blot test "to identify children 'who have violent and
homicidal tendencies.'" N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1970, at 15, col. I. Although Dr. Hutschnecher
complained that his "'labor of love [had been] turned into a sinister plot,'" Washington Post,
supra at I, HEW wasted little time rejecting his proposal. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1970, § E, at 13,
34. Society reacts to a potentially dangerous long-term situation, if at all, through legislative
action. Although a remedy is legislative in nature, it it still the reaction of the public at large, and
therefore will be termed "society's" reaction here.
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probability of danger from the members of class X, it first would be
necessary to identify the individual members. In order to identify X
individuals, mass testing of some kind would be required. For example,
if class X were defined as those people suffering from the XYY syndrome, all children could be tested at birth for the presence of the
abnormality. The constitutional considerations concerning mass testing

of individuals whose freedom will be restricted in some manner following identification will be discussed in the following sections.3 5
1. The Fifth Amendment.-The fifth amendment provides that a
person may not be compelled to give testimony against himself. It is

arguable that requiring an individual to submit to an examination that
will identify him as a member of class X, and therefore result in restrictions on his freedom, forces him to testify against himself. If the class
were characterized by the XYY syndrome, the evidence to establish an
individual's membership in the class could be acquired only from him.

Would it be possible, therefore, for an individual to contend successfully
that submitting to the test violates the fifth amendment?

There is no mass test in use today-that is, an examination administered to every individual in the country-that closely parallels the
examination hypothesized. The fifth amendment is oriented toward the

introduction of evidence at a criminal trial, however, and analogous
identification processes do exist.36 Fingerprinting and testing for blood
type are examinations that may establish a defendant's guilt, and information resulting from these procedures can be obtained only by examin-

ing the defendant.
The fifth amendment has been raised unsuccessfully in objections
to evidence indicating a defendant's blood grouping test in criminal
proceedings. For example, in State v. Alexander,3 defendant's seconddegree murder conviction was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court

despite the introduction of evidence that his blood type matched that on
the murder weapon. The court rejected defendant's objection that evi35. One constitutional consideration can be dealt with briefly. There could be no violation
of equal protection arising from the mere fact of testing since equal protection is concerned with
the legislative division of the general population into classes and the determination of whether the
classes constructed are unfair to some members. With mass testing, however, the entire population
would be examined, not just the members of class X. If there are no subdivisions of the general
populace, definitionally there can be no denial of equal protection.
36. The fifth amendment's use is not confined to a criminal proceeding against the defendant.
For example, a potential defendant can assert the privilege when testifying in another proceeding.
See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 1503 (1930) (application of privilege against self-incrimination in nonjudicial proceedings). It should be possible, therefore, for an individual to assert the fifth amendment
at the time of testing or when test results are introduced in a subsequent proceeding to restrict his
freedom.
37. 7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
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dence of his blood type was inadmissible because he consented to the
test only to ascertain whether he was suffering from venereal disease.
Finding that the privilege against self-incriminration protects a defendant only against the use of testimonial evidence and not against compulsory physical examinations-even if defendant were tricked into taking the examination-the court found defendant's objection without
merit. :8
The New Jersey court's conclusion that the fifth amendment is
applicable only to testimonial evidence was upheld by the Supreme
40 In
Court in United States v. Wade, 39 and Schmerber v. California.
Wade, the Court found that forcing defendant to participate in a lineup did not violate the fifth amendment since it did not compel him "to
give evidence having testimonial significance."'" Schmerber is even
more closely analogous to the mass testing hypothesized. There, defendant was hospitalized following an automobile accident. A policeman,
smelling liquor on defendant's breath, arrested him and ordered doctors
to perform a blood test. In upholding defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the fifth amendment protects an individual
only against providing the state with "evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood. . . did not involve
compulsion .. ."42
Courts generally have reached similar conclusions concerning contentions that fingerprint evidence violates the fifth amendment. In the
classic case in the area, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the use of fingerprints for the purpose of identifying a defendant accused
of crime does not compel a defendant to give testimony against himself.43 In upholding the practice, Judge Augustus Hand stated that
"[t]he slight interference with the person involved in finger printing [sic]
seems to us one which must be borne in the common interest."4 4 Finger38. See also Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A.2d 289 (1948) (murder prosecution-blood
grouping test taken without defendant's knowing the reason upheld); Commonwealth v. Statti, 166
Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950) (blood typing test without defendant's consent indicated his
blood same as type found at scene of assault and battery).
39. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
40. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
41. 388 U.S. at 222. The Court reversed defendant's conviction, however, because he was
not given the right to have counsel present during the line-up.
42. 384 U.S. at 761. See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Et Min Ng v.
Brownell, 258 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1958) (blood test used to prove nonpaternity in immigration
proceeding). But see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Court rejected evidence under the
fourth amendment when police forced defendant to vomit evidence as shocking the conscience of
the Court).
43. United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).
44. Id. at 68. See also Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 935-37 (9th Cir. 1966): United
States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1965).
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print evidence has been rejected, however, when it is found to be the
product of an illegal search or arrest not based on probable cause.45
The individual resisting compulsory tests to determine membership
in class X would argue that the blood sample and fingerprint analogy
under the fifth amendment are not aposite since both of those tests are
based on a reasonable probability that the defendant in question has
some relationship to the crime under investigation. The fingerprint and
blood group analogies are inappropriate, therefore, because mass testing for membership in class X is not based upon probable cause indicating the individual tested is a member of class X.
Proponents of mass testing would counter that the Supreme Court
has stated clearly that the fifth amendment is applicable to testimonial
evidence only. The guarantee against self-incrimination, therefore, is
inapplicable to physical testing. Furthermore, public policy arguments
for societal self-protection would be said to override the individual's
self-interest and require that the burden of testing be borne. Given these
arguments, it is unlikely that the member of class X could rely on the
fifth amendment alone to prohibit mass examinations since the evidence
garnered clearly is nontestimonial in nature.
2. The Fourth Amendment.-The fourth amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. Implementation of the amendment's guarantee has rested on the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a criminal proceeding46 rather than on absolute prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. As traditionally construed,
the amendment therefore would not be amenable to use as the basis of
a proceeding to enjoin testing. The individual seeking to avoid identification as a member of class X could rely on the amendment only if the
identification procedure were deemed equivalent to a criminal trial.
A person utilizing the fourth amendment in the hypothetical situation would argue that the restrictions47 resulting from identification as
a member of class X render the identification process tantamount to a
criminal proceeding.48 In a criminal proceeding, evidence seized without
probable cause is infirm and inadmissible under the fourth amendment.49 Evidence indicating that any particular individual suffers from
45. Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
46. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961): Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
47. The possible restrictions arising from membership in class X are discussed below. See
text accompanying notes 59 & 60 infra.
48. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967) (civil juvenile proceeding requires constitutional
criminal procedural protections because of possible lengthy incarceration).
49. E.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959).
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the characteristics common to members of class X, if acquired in mass
testing, would have been obtained without probable cause because no
one individual was suspected-the population in general was surveyed.
If the fourth amendment argument prevailed, the only evidence establishing A as a member of class X would be inadmissible in a proceeding
to identify him as such.
Public policy, however, might override A's personal interest. The
fourth amendment protects the public against unreasonable search and
seizure; testing for X victims also is designed to protect the public.
Which public interest would prevail is debatable. The fourth amendment
is embodied in the Constitution, whereas testing would have a statutory
basis. The fourth amendment argument, on the other hand, has a weak
flank exposed-adjudication as a member of class X would not be
statutorily described as a criminal proceeding. The restrictions would be
designed simply to protect society. The outcome of the fourth amendment argument likely would hinge upon the particular court's inclination to characterize the proceeding as "criminal" or "civil." With the
precedent of juvenile delinquency proceedings and adjudications of an
individual as mentally ill, both intended to be civil in nature, considered
sufficiently severe by courts to require many of the procedural protections of a criminal trial,5 A might be successful in his argument for the
exclusion of mass-testing evidence.
3. The Right of Privacy.-One resisting the examination to
discover the existence of characteristics common to class X would argue
that mass testing violates the right of privacy. The right of privacy has
long existed at common law." Only recently, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,52 has it gained constitutional stature.
The scope of Griswold's protection, however, is entirely uncertain.
The decision was concerned with a Connecticut birth control law, a long
outdated anomaly. The constitutional right of privacy was found to
emanate from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the
Constitution. The majority opinion spoke of the right as absolute, although this language possibly reflected only the feebleness of the state
interest offered in justification of the statute. Whether the Griswold
right of privacy is broad enough to prohibit mass testing to gather
information useful in protecting society against those identified as unusually dangerous is unclear.
In further developing the parameters of the constitutional right of
privacy, courts may examine the common-law right predating Griswold.
50.
51.
52.

E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 1 (1952).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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As with the privilege against self-incrimination, the right of privacy has
provided several cases testing the scope of the state's power to require
fingerprinting.
In State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall,53 for example, a citizen acquitted of a misdemeanor alleged that the maintenance of his arrest record,
photograph, and fingerprints violated the right of privacy. Refusing to
order the records destroyed, the court observed that an individual's right
of privacy must be balanced against the public interest. The court found
that the public's need to take fingerprints and photographs and maintain
files on individuals after arrest was paramount to the personal right of
privacy.
Similarly, in Roesch v. Ferber" plaintiff was arrested for a speeding violation and committed to jail pending the posting of bail. The
court rejected plaintiff's request that the county be ordered to return his
fingerprints and photographs. The court found that the identification
procedures were purely incidental to plaintiff's arrest and, in addition
to providing a positive means of identifying prisoners, served the important purpose of identifying men wanted in other jurisdictions. The individual's right of privacy, therefore, succumbed to the public good.
In addition to criminal cases, several civil actions have challenged
the validity of statutes requiring that applicants for various public positions submit to police identification procedures. For example, in Walton
v. City of Atlanta,55 plaintiffs argued that requiring fingerprints and
photographs as prerequisites to being licensed as taxi drivers violated
their right of privacy. The court, however, without discussing a public
need for identification, found that the city's police power to protect the
public weal overrode the individual's right.
Similarly, in Norman v. City ofLas Vegas,5" the court upheld a city
ordinance requiring that employees of retail liquor stores be fingerprinted. Plaintiffs urged that the city should be compelled to justify its
restrictions on the personal right of privacy with facts or statistics indicating a need for identification of retail liquor employees. The court
rejected plaintiffs' arguments and found that the city's police power
conferred broad discretion in protecting safety, morals, good order, and
the general welfare."
53. 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946).
54. 48 N.J. Super. 231, 137 A.2d 61 (1957). See also Herschel v. Drya, 365 F.2d 17 (7th
Cir.) (court refused to expunge record of plaintiff's arrest for distributing handbills), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 973 (1966).
55. 89 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1949), modified, 180 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1950).
56. 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947).
57. New Jersey has similar statutes requiring fingerprinting for the purpose of identification
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Would mass testing for individuals suffering from a physical predisposition to criminality invade their right of privacy? The foregoing
decisions indicate that the police power of the state would override the
private right. The right of police to maintain fingerprint and photograph
files is not confined to convicted criminals. Individuals acquitted of
crimes cannot have their records expunged; persons whose jobs require
state control and identification must submit to identification procedures
or forego that employment. Since the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the state cannot condition the grant of a privilege upon the
surrender of a constitutional right, 8 these cases cannot be read as resting upon any special relationship between the persons affected and the
state; the logical conclusion is that mass fingerprinting would be constitutionally permissible as within the police power of the state, notwith.
standing the right of privacy. Testing for membership in class X woulc
be even more important than fingerprinting to the public-protectinj
society against persons identified as unusually prone to violence is a
higher public need than maintaining identification files on acquitted
suspects.
Moreover, there is precedent for mass solutions to public problems.
Smallpox innoculation of all school schildren has been upheld as a
proper exercise of the police power despite the individual's right to
freedom of religion and the lack of any recent evidence of smallpox. For
example, Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health59 held that a child
had to be vaccinated in light of a statute so requiring although the
parents protested on religious grounds, and although there had been no
smallpox in the area in years and none was expected.6" Thus the individual's personal right was viewed as inferior to the public good.
An individual seeking to rely on the right of privacy to prevent
examination would find little favorable precedent. In similar balancing
processes, his interest regularly has folded before the public need as
enforced under the state's police power. While he could argue that no
mass identification procedure had ever been undertaken before, he
would find little favorable precedent.
4. Conclusion.-Ofthe constitutional provisions a criminally predisposed person might rely upon in attempting to thwart the state's
of all employees of licensed private detectives, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:19-16 (1963); school bus
drivers, id. § 18A:39-17, -18 (1968); employees of check cashing licensees, id. § 17:15A-3 (1970);
and allowing mental institutions to require that patients be fingerprinted, id. § 30:4-126.1 (1964).
58. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404, 406 (1963); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1599-602 (1960).
59. 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948).
60. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upheld state smallpox vaccination statute under police power).
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attempt to determine whether he is a member of class X, only the fourth
amendment offers realistic hope. If the restrictions imposed are sufficiently onerous to impel a court to equate the identification process with
criminal proceedings, then it might be possible to prevent the introduction of evidence indicating A's membership in class X in the adjudicatory procedure since it would not have been obtained on probable cause
-rather, it would have been gathered in mass examinations. Obviously,
however, the argument is dependent upon the characterization of the
adjudicatory procedure. The fifth amendment argument fails because of
the Supreme Court's interpretation that the amendment prohibits only
testimonial self-incrimination. In analogous right-of-privacy litigation,
the individual's resistance to information-gathering usually has failed
before the state's interest in the testing.
A form of testing other than mass examinations could be implemented by the state. Rather than across the board checking for members of class X, the state could examine only people who are arrested
or convicted of a crime. Having already shown a propensity for violence,
the subjects could be examined to determine whether the X abnormality
accounts for their antisocial behavior. Thus, having based the investigation on probable cause-violence is a reason to search for the existence
of the X abnormality-the testing might withstand fourth amendment
attack.
One factor exists favoring the individuals in their challenge to mass
testing-nothing quite like it has ever been undertaken. That no analogous activity has ever been prohibited does not mean mass testing to
identify individuals whose freedom will be restricted would be upheld.
If such a procedure were disfavored it could be struck down as an
invasion of the right of privacy. It would be simple for the Supreme
Court to hold that the individual's interest in this particular area is
paramount to society's-whether a court would be willing to override
society's legislative decision in favor of the individual who challenges the
procedure is questionable.
B.

SurveillanceAs Society's Method of Deterringthe Violent Conduct
of Class X Members
Society would not seek to identify members of class X unless it
intended to use the information to protect itself. Society's selfprotection translates into restricting the freedom of those individuals in
some manner. If a person is more violence-prone than the ordinary
individual, limiting his ability to harm fellow citizens could be accomplished in various ways. Two will be considered here: constant surveillance and incarceration.
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Violence-prevention through surveillance might be possible if a person inclined to violence would be restrained by the knowledge that he
is being watched. Surveillance also would enhance the ability of authorities to react quickly to intervene if the individual's behavior became
unacceptable. It has been suggested that the technology exists today to
implant a tracking device in an individual and monitor his activities
through radio or radar.6 Although sophisticated electronic tracking
devices are an extreme possibility, the activity of class X members could
be monitored by a combination of modern surveillance techniques. For
the purposes of discussion it will be assumed that a statute has been
enacted implementing a program of surveillance of identified class X
members that includes wiretaps, audio monitoring, closed circuit television, random police surveillance, and required monthly appointments
with a government official for interrogation and observation.62 What
constitutional objections could A direct against the government intervention in his life?
1. The Right of Privacy.-Constant governmental surveillance
undoubtedly invades the privacy of the person who is the government's
object; whether the state's interest outweighs that of the individual,
however, is unclear. It seems certain that the individual's right to privacy is not absolute, despite Griswold's language to that effect.6"
None of the cases that have tested the limits of the right of privacy
are concerned with surveillance as a means of controlling behavior.
Most eavesdropping and surveillance cases allege violation of the right
of privacy when an opponent in litigation attempts to gather information to prove plaintiff's claim fraudulent.64 The surveillance hypothesized is for the purpose of preventing undesirable conduct. Despite the
difference in reason for surveillance between litigation invasion-ofprivacy cases and the hypothetical surveillance cases, the former shed
some light on the scope of an individual's right of privacy.
65
In a number of cases, courts have found that eavesdropping
and/or surveillance 6 violates an individual's right to privacy. For exam61. See TIMe, May 1, 1972, at 10; Gaylin, supra note 5.
62. No doubt other restrictions would be imposed, such as prohibiting class X members from
owning weapons.
63. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
64. See cases cited notes 67-74 infra.
65. "Eavesdropping" is defined as the surreptitious overhearing, either directly by ear or by
means of a mechanical device like a wiretap, microphone, or amplifier, of an individual's private
conversation. Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1296, 1297 (1967).
66. "Surveillance" includes following and continually observing the movements and activity
of an individual.
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pie, in one of the most cited cases in the area, Rhodes v. Graham,7 the
court found that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action in alleging
that his right to be left alone was abridged when defendant installed a
tap on his telephone. Similarly, in Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co.," the Fifth Circuit held that Georgia law established a right of
privacy that would be violated when the Internal Revenue Service
tapped plaintiff's telephone. Rejecting defendants' contention that the
wiretap was within the scope of their official duty and that therefore
they were immune from civil prosecution, the court found the right of
privacy could be abridged despite the fact that there was no publication
of the information overheard."
In McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-ColaBottling Co.,70 the court found
that plaintiff's privacy was violated and plaintiff entitled to damages
when defendant monitored conversations in plaintiff's hospital room in
an attempt to prove plaintiff's claim fraudulent. The right of privacy
was founded in part upon a state criminal statute prohibiting eavesdropping. In the celebrated case of Nader v. General Motors Corp.,71 the
New York Court of Appeals found that plaintiff's complaint stated a
cause of action for invasion of privacy under the applicable District of
Columbia law. The specific allegations held sufficient to state a cause
of action were that defendant engaged in unauthorized wiretapping and
eavesdropping by electronic means, and that defendant's agents followed plaintiff closely enough to examine the denominations of bills he
withdrew from the bank.
Finally, courts have held that surveillance of an opponent in litigation to establish the invalidity of his claim violates the right of privacy
if the surveillance takes on the nature of harassment or intimidation.
For example, Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc. 72 found a violation
of the right of privacy when defendant's detectives constantly watched
plaintiff with binoculars, trespassed on his property, and peeped in his
windows. In a similar case, defendant used "rough shadowing"- following continually and openly to inform everyone plaintiff was under
surveillance-as retribution for testimony plaintiff gave against defendant in another judicial proceeding.73 The court found a violation of
67. 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
68. 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965).
69. See also Hamberger v. Eastmen, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) (upheld judgment
for plaintiff on violation of right of privacy when defendant planted microphone in bedroom,
despite fact that no one listened to conversations monitored).
70. 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
71. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
72. 88 So.2d 716 (La. App. 1956).
73. Shultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W.
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plaintiff's right of privacy.
There are other cases, however, in which courts have found no
violation of the right of privacy in defendant's surveillance or eavesdropping. For example, reasonable surveillance and investigation of a party
to litigation is justified by the public interest in exposing fraudulent
claims.74 Furthermore, California courts have held that there is no right
of privacy for a person held in prison before being convicted of a crime,
when a party alleged an invasion of the right of privacy after the state
75
monitored a suspect's conversation with his wife.
The Court of Claims, in Wissner v. United States, 76 held that there
was no violation of plaintiff's right of privacy when a government contractor allowed the FBI to listen to his telephone conversation with
plaintiff. Furthermore, the social security administration does not violate an applicant's right of privacy in collecting information to determine his eligibility for benefits. 7 Gathering such information is within
the scope of the agency's duties and therefore the administration is
78
immune from civil litigation.
From the foregoing cases it is apparent that the individual's right
of privacy is not absolute. It can be protected against unwarranted
harassment, especially by a party to litigation. Some conduct-inducing
surveillance-that aimed at forcing a compromise, for instance-is
actionable. Many invasions, however, are protected-the outcome depends upon a balancing of the interests involved.
Government-authorized surveillance to induce acceptable behavior
and prevent crime appears fundamentally different from the activities
that courts have thus far considered in right-of-privacy cases. One can
only speculate whether an invasion of the right would be found. The
invasions of privacy found actionable all involve surveillance unjustified
by public need. The right of privacy described in Griswold was not
challenged by a substantial state interest. Because of the precedent allowing surveillance when a public interest is served, it seems improbable
that the right of privacy would offer protection against surveillance
386 (1913).
74. See, e.g., Tucker v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 437 (Fla. App. 1965).
75. People v. Morgan, 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1961), cerl. denied,
370 U.S. 965 (1962) (need of preventing escapes justifies monitoring conversation on intraprison
telephone used by prisoner to talk with wife on other side of glass). See also People v. Ross, 236
Cal. App. 2d 364, 46 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1965).
76. 176 Ct. Cl. 1372 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 981 (1967).
77. Benjamin v. Ribicoff, 205 F. Supp. 532 (D. Mass. 1962).
78. See also Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (no violation
of employee's right of privacy to make movie of him working for purposes of time and motion
study).
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authorized by legislation based on a legitimate state need.
2. The Fourth Amendment.-Govern mental surveillance of
individuals by wiretapping was challenged first in Olmstead v. United
States,79 which upheld the practice on the basis that, since no physical
evidence was seized, the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures was inviolate. In later cases, the Supreme Court
occasionally found that wiretapping violated the fourth amendment
when the premises tapped were physically penetrated." Thus the fourth
amendment was abridged when police entered a suspect's home to plant
a microphone or when the microphone penetrated the baseboard of
defendant's residence.8
Articulation of fourth amendment standards usually occurs in the
context of deciding whether to exclude evidence offered in a trial. The
Supreme Court's discussions, however, often indicate a right of privacy
specifically protected by the fourth amendment through broader means
than the mere exclusion of evidence. Thus, in Berger v. New York,8 2 the
Supreme Court invalidated an eavesdropping statute that had been relied upon in gathering evidence necessary to defendant's conviction. The
statute was constitutionally infirm for failing to require that the officer
requesting judicial authorization specify the particular offense suspected, for failing to describe the "property" to be seized, and for
allowing surveillance to continue for two months with subsequent renewals. The statute was overly broad, and surveillance conducted under
its aegis was prohibited by the fourth amendment.
Statutory authorization for surveillance of criminally predisposed
persons would suffer from the same infirmities as the New York statute.
It would necessarily continue for an unlimited period, could not be
designed to investigate a particular crime, and could not specify the
evidence sought. Thus, although an individual's privacy may be invaded
by properly authorized government action, a statute providing for continuous surveillance of members of class X apparently would violate the
fourth amendment. The argument that the surveillance could be conducted if there were no physical trespass has been overcome by the
Court's rejection of that doctrine in Katz v. United States.0
The contrary argument is that the fourth amendment's prohibitions
79.

277 U.S. 438 (1928). Olmstead was subsequently overruled in the case of Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
80. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search of defendant's home violates
fourteenth amendment in state court criminal proceeding); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961) (spike mike penetrated base of wall of defendant's home).
81. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
82. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
83. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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generally are enforced by excluding tainted evidence from a criminal
proceeding, and the purpose of class X surveillance would not be to
gather evidence for trial, but to prevent crime. Since most fourth
amendment cases do involve exclusion of evidence,8 4 the argument has
merit. Based upon the Berger rationale, however, a statute providing for
such surveillance appears to be unconstitutional under the fourth
amendment. Nevertheless, the hypothetical surveillance statute is distinguishable from the statute involved in Berger since the purpose of the
two laws is fundamentally different. The Berger-type statute allows
police to "seize" evidence when they have probable cause to suspect that
a crime has been committed; the hypothetical statute, on the other hand,
is designed to prevent criminal acts. One can only speculate whether this
difference would validate continuous search, lack of probable cause, and
failure to require specification of the evidence sought.
C.

ConstitutionalConsiderationsAffecting Incarcerationof Members
of Class X to Prevent Antisocial Behavior

Rather than seeking to control undesirable behavior of the members of class X through surveillance, the danger to society might be
deemed serious enough to warrant incarceration. This discussion will
focus on whether constitutional limitations would prevent the incarceration of members of class X after a legislative determination that the
threat to society posed by those individuals requires that they be segregated from the rest of the population. Similar statutes exist today regulating the conduct of sexual psychopaths, providing for incarceration of
the mentally ill, and sterilization of the mentally deficient.8 5
1. Sexual Psychopaths.-The state has two primary sources of
power available to regulate the conduct of sexual psychopaths: the po8
lice power and its role as parenspatriae.
1 Police power is defined as the
ability to regulate the conduct of individuals within society to promote
the general welfare. 7 The parens patriae concept, on the other hand,
encompasses the power to protect an individual against self-induced
harm.85
84. E.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928); cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967).
85. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-156 (Supp. 1972).
86. Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of Due Process,21 OHIO
ST. L.J. 28, 32-33 (1960).
87. See Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312,322,24 N.W.2d 244,250 (1946);
cf District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909) (the state police power is one of
government's least limitable powers).
88. E.g., Hook v. Simes, 98 N.H. 280, 98 A.2d 165 (1953).
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A sexual psychopath is defined by applicable statutes in each state.
A typical definition is one who is unable to control his behavior and as
a consequence commits sexual crimes.8 9 These statutes have only existed
since about 1930. Before that time, society treated sexual psychopaths
either as criminal or people suffering from mental illness.9
The validity of sexual psychopath statutes under the due process
clause of the federal constitution has been repeatedly challenged. In one
case, for instance, the person declared a sexual psychopath charged that
the statute allowed the decision of two psychiatrists to send him to an
institution indefinitely.' The court upheld the statute as a legitimate
regulation of abnormal people in order to confine and treat them for
their own good as well as society's. In an analysis typical of the disposition of due process arguments, the court, ignoring the substantive question of the statute's basic validity, found the commitment procedurally
flawless and thus dismissed defendant's constitutional challenge. Defendant's attack on the validity of the statute as a conduct-regulating device
was rejected in favor of the state's police power.
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. ProbateCourt" is the definitive ruling
on the validity of sexual psychopath statutes. In that case a Minnesota
statute allowed indefinite commitment of a "psychopathic personality"
-one whose past conduct indicates that he is unable to control his
sexual impulses. The Court rejected relator's charge that the statute
violated the equal protection clause, saying that the "legislature is free
to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those
classes of cases where the need is deemed . . . clearest." 93 As is often
the case in challenges to such statutes, relator's substantive due process
argument was dismissed by examining and upholding the procedures
provided by the statute.
2. Incarcerationof the Mentally Ill.-Closely related to statutes
confining sexual psychopaths are the state laws providing for the involuntary incarceration of those deemed mentally ill.14 State power to regulate the mentally ill has the same sources as the capacity to incarcerate
sexual psychopaths-police power and parens patriae.
In State v. Sanchez,95 defendant was declared non compos mentis
89.
90.
91.
92.

Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 352 (1952).
Id. at 351.
People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
309 U.S. 270 (1940).

93. Id. at 275.
94. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson is the leading case cited in upholding statutes regulating the
mentally ill.
95. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969).
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under the New Mexico statute and incarcerated indefinitely. Defendant
challenged the statute's constitutionality under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In rejecting his claim that the state had
no power to deprive him of liberty under such a procedure, the court
found that state custody of the mentally ill has been recognized as a
legislative responsibility from time immemorial, and thus was not open
to serious attack. Once again, the due process clause's protection was
construed as procedural only, and in that respect sufficient. "Persons
may be deprived of their liberty for the good of society or themselves.
This is not a deprivation of due process of law, but a temporary restraint
on liberty, based on the extent of the illness, the need for treatment and
hospitalization, as well as the protection of society."9 Finally the court
rejected defendant's assertion, based on the less intrusive alternative
doctrine,97 that total institutionalization was unnecessary-that some
other method less onerous to defendant could be utilized to protect
society. The court held that since the statute was constitutional the
doctrine was inapplicable.
5 inThe decision in Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels"
volved a constitutional challenge to Maryland's statute providing for
incarceration of "defective delinquents." Plaintiff was confined indefinitely after being adjudged a defective delinquent. After three years in
the institution, plaintiff attempted to be adjudicated "cured." A jury
found him still a member of the class of people restricted by the statute.
Maryland's highest court found that the statute's provisions were designed to reach persons who exhibit persistent, aggravated criminal or
antisocial behavior. This definition of "defective delinquent" was found
sufficiently narrow to withstand constitutional attack. Even though the
class thus created included people, sane under the M'Naghten rule, who
persist in antisocial behavior, the legislative intent was held to be that
the subjects should be treated as suffering from mental illness rather
than as criminals, since the purpose of the statute was simply to protect
society from those with criminal propensities and confine them for treatment. Rejecting plaintiff's due process challenge, the court said that the
state has power to restrain the liberty of persons found dangerous to the
common health and safety if the restraints are based on legislative
action that describes a recognized group with clarity and definiteness.
Indefinite confinement was then found reasonably calculated to achieve
96.
97.
complete
98.

Id. at 441, 457 P.2d at 373.
The less intrusive alternative doctrine directs the court to explore alternatives in lieu of
institutionalization. Cf Lake v. Cameron, 346 F.2d 657 (1966).
243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
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the purpose of protecting society and curing the defective person. Since
it did not use an overly vague definition, and provided numerous procedural safeguards, the statute was upheld against plaintiff's due process
challenge. 9
3. Sterilization of Individuals Suffering from Mental
Deficienc.-Statutes exist in at least 21 states providing for the compulsory sterilization of "mentally-deficient" individuals,, 0 and "with
few exceptions the mentally ill are similarly identified as being within
the scope of the statutes."'' In re Cavitt"I involved a constitutional
challenge to Nebraska's statute requiring sterilization of patients prior
to release from the state home for the feeble-minded. Plaintiff could
avoid sterilization-but only by remaining incarcerated for life. Upholding the statute under the state's police power, the court rejected all
of plaintiff's constitutional arguments. Due process was satisfied because of the procedural protection provided and despite proof that the
offspring of feeble-minded individuals will not inevitably be similarly
afflicted. The court indicated that no complete relationship between
sterilization and the evil to be avoided was necessary-the only requirement under the statute was that the patient be mentally deficient and
capable of having children. That a person mentally deficient because of
a noninheritable accident or disease might be sterilized was insignificant
in the court's eyes. In an incredible final sentence the court said that
the choice was up to plaintiff-she could choose whether to remain
institutionalized or regain her freedom by submitting to the saplingectomy.
4. Incarceration of Individuals Identified As Members of Class
X.-Incarceration of individuals identified as possessing the prerequisites to membership in class X would be subject to the same constitutional attacks as confinement of sexual psychopaths and the mentally
ill. Analysis of a hypothetical statute requiring involuntary institutionalization of all class X people indicates that the law would withstand
these traditional constitutional challenges. Nevertheless, there are differences between the members of class X and sexual psychopaths and
99. In rejecting plaintiff's equal protection argument, the court cited Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), which upheld a statute prohibiting bottling of gas taken
from below a certain depth. Application of the rational basis test to a statute, admittedly civil in
nature, that would incarcerate plaintiff for life is questionable. Even had the compelling interest
test been applied, however, the court probably would have had little trouble finding a compelling

state interest.
100. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 210 (rev. ed.
1971).
101. Id.
102. 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171, afi'd on rehearing, 183 Neb. 243, 159 N.W.2d 566
(1968). appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970).
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persons suffering from mental illness. Whether those differences are
sufficient to render precedent inapplicable is unclear. The basic rationale for constitutionally protecting such individuals is latent in due
process-natural rights concepts; an innovative court could seize the opportunity to provide constitutional assistance to potential victims.
(a) Traditional analysis.-A state seeking to incarcerate X victims has two powers at its disposal: the police power and parenspatriae.
The police power is referred to continually as an almost unlimited
weapon in protecting public health, safety, and general welfare. Concurrently, the state's power to act as parenspatriaein protecting individuals
from harming themselves or others is vast. Although strict procedural
limitations have been imposed on the method of adjudging one a juve0 3 or mentally ill,t"' no attack on the basic right of the
nile delinquent"
state to incarcerate juvenile delinquents or the mentally ill has been
successful. Thus, so long as the state provides the necessary procedural
safeguards-the right to notice, to a hearing, to confront adverse witnesses, to judicial review, and possibly to trial by jury-an attack on the
state's basic power to protect its citizens, through appropriate legislation, against individuals deemed a threat, would fail under existing precedent.
There are several significant conclusions to be drawn from analysis
of past constitutional challenges to preventive legislation. Probably the
most startling is that the state need not establish that there is any
positive correlation between the individual's affliction and the harm to
be avoided. For example, the court in Cavitt °5 was not at all impressed
by evidence that some feeble-minded patients might be sterilized whose
children would not have been similarly afflicted. Analogously, that a
person has once committed an act of violence is no proof at all that he
will do so in the future. Nevertheless, a preventive detention statute
assumes, despite contrary statistics,"0 ' that there is a great likelihood
that an ex-convict suspected of a subsequent crime will commit yet
another if not incarcerated awaiting trial. The same assumption is made
about individuals institutionalized for mental illness. A person's past
bizarre conduct is accepted as proof that he will be violent in the future.
103. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
104. E.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (Colorado's sexual psychopath statute
violates procedural due process in denying the right to a hearing and to confront adverse witnesses).
105. 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1970). For a discussion of Cavitt see text accompanying
note 102 supra.
106. See Dershowitz, On Preventive Detention, in CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 307, 317, 318
(A. Goldstein & J. Goldstein ed. 1971).
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Another surprising thread running through the cases examined is
the failure of the courts-from the Supreme Court of the United States
to state courts-to recognize substantive due process issues. Courts have
invariably analyzed due process arguments in terms of procedural due
process-if the statute provided the minimal requisite procedural safeguards, the due process argument was dismissed. Whether the courts'
failure even to consider the validity of the state's power to enact such
conduct-regulating statutes resulted from judicial misunderstanding or
lack of perseverance on the part of attorneys is unclear. Nevertheless,
it is unfortunate that judicial analysis of the basic validity of the statutes
has been limited to considering only the correlative of substantive due
process-state police power. Inevitably, analysis was limited to the permissible breadth of the police power and did not explore the substantive
restrictions imposed by the due process clause.
The court in State v. Sanchez,"7 a 1969 decision, held the less
intrusive alternative rationale inapplicable to a statute providing for
incarceration of the mentally ill. None of the other cases discussed
considered the doctrine. Since incarceration impinges upon the most
fundamental aspects of individual liberty, one would have thought that
the least restrictive method available of protecting society would have
been required. Nevertheless, the court rejected defendant's argument
that he could not be incarcerated for mental illness if a less onerous
method of protecting society were available.
(b) Application to X members.-The foregoing conclusions,
drawn from analysis of cases that involved challenges to statutes with
restrictions on classes of people similar to class X, bodes ill for X
members. Under a least intrusive alternative theory, if the state could
accomplish its end by maintaining surveillance of X members rather
than incarcerating them, it would be required to do so. Under the
Sanchez rationale, however, the state is not even required to consider
an alternative method of protecting its interests. In any event, logic
dictates that it is probable that the state could prove surveillance is less
effective in protecting society than is incarceration.
Judicial failure to question the state's power to incarcerate noncriminals is equally unfortunate. The technique of accepting established
practice, simply noting that it is a time-honored tradition,' obviously
begs the question. It indicates, however, both a judicial reluctance to
scrutinize the essential validity of statutes that incarcerate persons con107. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969). For a discussion of the case see text accompanying
notes 95-96 supra.
108. E.g., Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
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sidered dangerous and a tendency to redirect examination toward the
procedures for implementing the process, thus granting the validity of
the end-incarceration. Members of class X are likely, therefore, to find
substantive due process a difficult argument to bring against society's
restrictions.
The failure of the decided cases to demonstrate any constitutional
requirement that an individual, before he can be incarcerated, be shown
very likely to commit violence is troublesome. There apparently need
be no positive correlation between the class restricted and the likelihood
that an individual member will commit acts of violence unless incarcerated. Thus, despite statistics indicating that few individuals detained
would in fact commit a crime while awaiting trial, the District of
Columbia's preventive detention statute is still in force."'
There is one significant difference between the danger presented by
members of class X and the danger of the classes of restricted individuals heretofore discussed. With class X the statistics would indicate
that the likelihood of any one individual committing a violent act is 25
percent, compared to five percent for the general population. There
would be no other indication, however, that any individual will ever
commit a violent act. The only thing that has been identified is the
individual's membership in a class of human beings with increased violent tendencies. In contrast, a person incarcerated as a sexual psychopath not only belongs to a class that possesses a high statistical probability of future antisocial behavior, but has also in the past committed an
unacceptable sexual act. Whether he will do so in the future is uncertain;
his membership in the class, however, is based not upon possessing
certain chromosomes or a given chemical imbalance, but upon observation of past behavior. His behavior indicates that he is a sexual psychopath, rather than indicating merely a latent tendency toward psychopathic behavior.
The relevance of the difference in sources for the statistical probability is uncertain. All individuals are members of a class with some
probability of violence. Whether any particular person will manifest
violent behavior cannot be determined. Identifying class X shifts the
individual to a smaller class with a higher probability of violence. Still,
no one can say whether any individual member of that class will commit
a violent act. Is an increase in probability from five to 25 percent
109. The outcome of a suit filed in the District of Columbia has not been reported yet. The
suit challenges preventive detention as a denial of the eighth amendment right to bail; as violative
of the presumption of innocence; as punishment before trial; and as a deprivation of due process
by interfering with the defendant's preparation for trial, Franklin, Stiff Crime Bill to Take Effect
in Capital Tomorrow, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1971, at 22, col. 3.
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sufficient to warrant incarceration? One can only guess. It is apparent,
however, that there is a difference between the individual who is known
to be suffering from a given malady because he has acted unacceptably
in the past-although he may never do so again-and the individual who
only has been identified as possessing certain characteristics that, in
some people, induce violence, but who has never been violent himself
and may never be in the future.
E. Natural Rights and Substantive Due Process

Having examined cases in which the constitutionality of similar
statutes has been challenged, it will be helpful to turn now to the constitutional principles that restrict a legislature's power to enact conductregulating legislation, in order to identify potential sources of protection
available to the members of class X.
1.

The Ninth Amendment and the Right of Privacy.-The ninth

amendment's unenumerated rights and the recently evolved constitutional right of privacy are relevant to the class X member's plight.
Although the ninth amendment is broader than the right of privacy,
considering them together is helpful, since Griswold v. Connecticut"'
provides the most recent explanation of both concepts.
The ninth amendment to the United States Constitution appears
to provide unequivocally that citizens have specific rights unenumerated
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights."' For many years, however, the amendment's potential was ignored.' 12 The difficulty in utilizing the ninth
amendment has lain in attempting to enumerate those unspecified
rights, and in bringing a vague sanction to bear upon specific legislative
enactments.'"3 The past century's unfortunate experience with the use
of the due process clause to invalidate economic legislation undoubtedly caused some judicial hesitancy in applying general prohibitions to
thwart the legislative will."' At the same time, the Supreme Court's use
of substantive due process to invalidate economic reform,'1 5 and in re110. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Il1. The ninth amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
112. See, e.g., B. PATrERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Redlich, Are
There "'ertain Rights. . . Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962).
113. See Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of Law-Toward a Viable
TheorI, of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 777 (1968).
114. Id. at 780-85.
115. Id; e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidated state minimum-hour
legislation); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (invalidated state statute regulating foreign

insurers).
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cent years, its use of procedural due process to expand the scope of

protection available in criminal trials,"' all through interpretation of the
words "life, liberty, and property," indicate the protection latent in the
scope of interpretation that may be afforded general prohibitions simi-

lar to the ninth amendment.
Legislative history of the ninth amendment indicates that it was
included specifically to ensure that the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights would not be construed to be the only rights retained by the
people."' Indeed, Alexander Hamilton objected to the concept of a Bill
of Rights because he feared that the legal maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alteriuswould operate to limit individual rights, especially since

it would be impossible to list comprehensively every right retained by
the people. In order to prevent Hamilton's fear from becoming reality,
James Madison included in the proposed amendments what ultimately
became the ninth amendment.'
Despite the compelling legislative history, the Supreme Court seldom mentioned the ninth amendment prior to 1965.119 Moreover, when

the amendment was mentioned, it was discussed almost incidentally
among other constitutional questions. 20 The Court's decision in
Griswold, however, breathed new life into the amendment. In addition
to the majority opinion's reliance on the ninth amendment as one of
several from which the right of privacy was found to emanate,2 Mr.
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion found that marital privacy was
12
squarely protected as an unenumerated right.

The difficulty in employing the ninth amendment comes in attempting to determine the unenumerated rights the Supreme Court may
find within the amendment's sweep. Family rights, the right to privacy,

personal fulfillment, and economic and property rights have been suggested as possible unenumerated rights. 2 An individual's rights under
116. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (strict standards established for determining voluntariness of confession in criminal trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(indigent's right to counsel in criminal proceeding introduced).
117. The Federalist No. 84, at 578-79 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); Bertelsman,supra
note 113, at 778-80.

118.

I ANNALS

OF CONG.

455-56 (1789) [1789-1824].

119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490 n.6 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
120. Bertelsman, supra note 113, at 781; see United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947) (upholding the Hatch Act, which forbade political activity on the part of certain federal
employees); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality of legislation
creating TVA).
121. 381 U.S. at 484.
122. Id. at 486-499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
123. Bertelsman, supra note 113, at 790-93. See also Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L.
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the ninth amendment could be interposed to challenge the state's police
power. The amendment is there for a court to use to prevent incarceration of an X member who has committed no crime. Nevertheless, it
never has been utilized to limit the state's power to confine the mentally
ill or sexual psychopaths, perhaps indicating the unlikeliness of its use
in the future for X members. When it is understood that there is a
possibility that every person will commit a violent act and that the only
difference between X members and the general population is a few
percentage points, possibly the X members' ninth amendment right
would be articulated.
2. Substantive Due Process.-Substantivedue process has been
24
defined as constitutional protection against conduct-regulating policy.
The state may seek to prohibit or compel certain conduct of individuals
or groups. If a court declared society's embodiment of that policy in
legislation unconstitutional under the due process clause, the court's
action would be characterized as based upon "substantive due process."
The traditional example of the use of substantive due process is the
Court's striking down economic legislation that abridged values the
Court thought to be ensconced in the clause. 2 5 One must determine,
therefore, the source of the values enforced today under the category
"due process."
The Supreme Court has utilized the due process clause to protect
values implicit in other provisions of the Constitution and values derived
from sources beyond the constitutional language. Examples of values
rooted in specific provisions of the Constitution include those which
support the protection against retroactivity implicit in the impairment
of contracts, eminent domain, and ex post facto clauses, 2 and those
values which buttress the right, implicit in the first amendment, to
pursue a private education and to learn a foreign language. 2 Nonconstitutional sources have generated due process rights such as freedom
28
of contract.
While the Court has abandoned the protection of economic rights
against conduct-regulating legislative enactments, it has not abandoned
REv. 1089 (1969); Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposalsfor the 1970's,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1205 (1966).
124. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1048,1049 (1968).
Ratner provides an excellent discussion of the policy and methodology of substantive due process.
125. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
126. See FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
127. Cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
128. Cases cited note 125 supra.
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the idea of protecting constitutional and nonconstitutional values under
the umbrella of the due process clause.' Modern due process restrictions have grown out of the Rochin-type "sense of justice" test. For
example, the Court employed a nonconstitutional value in upholding
Congress' deportation of an alien who had been duped into joining the
Community party.' The Court held that such legislation did not shock
3
its "sense of fair play-which is the essence of due process."' 1
In a similar application of unspecified constitutional principles, the
Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State had violated the rightto-travel value in the due process clause by revoking the passport of a
Communist. 32 The Court also relied upon the due process clause as an
alternative ground for invalidating a statute forbidding miscegenation,
saying the statute denied liberty without due process of law since marriage "is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very
existence and survival."'' 3 Griswold v. Connecticut 34 is the classic
modern use of vague values in overturning statutes disfavored by the
Court. In Griswold, the Court specifically rejected the idea of using the
due process clause to invalidate state economic legislation, and after
declining to sit as "a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need,
and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
or social conditions,"'' 35 held Connecticut's birth control law an unconstitutional invasion of marital privacy-a right emanating from several
constitutional provisions. Three justices, however, found that the due
process concept of liberty as embodied in the ninth amendment proscribed the Connecticut law,3 6 while Mr. Justice Harlan thought that
the statute directly infringed the "basic values 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty'" in the fourteenth amendment's due process
3
clause. 1
More recently, in Boddie v. Connecticut 3 Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, utilized due process to invalidate a fee prerequisite
to the judicial dismantling of a marriage. Although the opinion did not
expressly define the due process approach used, it relied heavily on
procedural due process cases. 39 It is not easy, however, to characterize
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Ratner, supra note 124, at 1052-53.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
Id.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., Warren, C.J., & Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
See id. at 377-78, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
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the decision as procedural. In contrast to invalidating a particular
method of conducting litigation, the Court held that using a fee to deny
indigents access to courts was unacceptable. Although the statute in
question regulated a formality of divorce litigation-payment of a fee
-the Court found that the state had interfered impermissibly with an
important personal right. In invalidating the statute the Court thus
engaged in an activity that is difficult to distinguish from the use of
substantive due process. Nevertheless, since the opinion did not explicitly set out the basis for the holding, the Court's current attitude toward
the due process clause is uncertain.
The Supreme Court's method of analysis in Boddie, however, is
clear. As in Griswold, the Court weighed the detriment to the individual
against the benefit to society. Although the failure to pay a fee and the
resulting inability to terminate a marriage has no res judicata effect, the
Court thought the practical consequence of the state's requirement was
to make divorce inaccessible to the poor.14 The Court concluded that
the harm to plaintiff far outweighed the state's justifications-deterring
frivolous litigation and recouping part of the cost of operating the judicial system.141
From recent due process cases, as well as the methodology utilized
in incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the fourteenth amendment, the Court's normal approach is clear. The governmental restriction is analyzed from the standpoint of the benefit to society and the
detriment to affected individuals. The Court then decides which is to
prevail.'
There is no question but that "[c]onstitutional phrases are construed and applied by each generation in the context of existing attitudes
and needs."'4 Utilizing the due process clause to invalidate economic
legislation was consistent with the economic theory prevalent when the
decisions were rendered.' The danger inherent in nonelected officials
determining which current values to enforce is reflected in the economictheory experience of the pre-Roosevelt era, and to a lesser extent, in the
Warren Court's activity in the area of criminal procedure.'45 On the
(1950): Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876); Baldwin
v. Hale, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 223 (1864).
140. 401 U.S. at 180.
141. Id. at 381-82.
142. This method of analysis is suggested in Ratner, supra note 124, at 1050.
143. Id. at 1048.
144. E.g., H. SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (T. Beale ed. 1916).
145. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); F. GRAHAM,
THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970).
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other hand, the Court's leadership and anticipation of widely held values
is exemplified in Brown v. Board of Education."' The only alternative
to the Court's enforcing societal values lies in its avoiding broad concepts such as due process, equal protection, and the ninth amendment's
natural rights-and even that degree of judicial restraint ignores the
necessary use of societal values in interpreting the interstices of legislative and constitutional provisions. Community value interpretation by
the judiciary is unavoidable; because legislatures reflect community values more closely, however, their enactments must be given deference. "'
The same considerations apply to substantive due process as to the
ninth amendment in considering examining constitutional protection for
the members of class X. Legislation restricting the freedom of X members would reflect a legislative judgment that community security outweighs the detriment to that class of people. There is ample precedent
for confining individuals thought dangerous to society and even for
sacrificing some lives to the community good. Provisions for incarceration of the mentally ill and sexual psychopaths, and sterilization of the
mentally deficient were discussed above. Although the due process
clause is held to require compensation for taking one's property, there
is no such requirement if society merely takes a person's liberty. "'
Similarly, the value of society's long-range survival justifies the sacrifice
of many lives during war. "9 Since society readily deprives other categories of people of liberty, a decision that one identified as a member of
class X cannot be incarcerated is unlikely.
F.

Equal Protection

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not
likely to provide a haven for the members of class X. During the past
decade, the clause has solidified into an alternative test, the function of
which is to protect individuals inappropriately lumped into a legislative
classification.' Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification
is examined and if the court concludes a rational relationship exists
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. Ratner, supra note 124, at 1078.
148. See Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law
of the Future, 78 YALE L.J. 339, 357 (1968).
149. Ratner, supra note 124, at 1076. Because of the political nature of the question, the
Supreme Court has refused to examine society's justification for taking lives even in an undeclared,
unpopular war such as that in Vietnam. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (state
challenge of legality of war); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1042 (1970) (taxpayer's challenge to war fund allocation); United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (criminal prosecution for draft evasion).
150. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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between the legislature's object and the class created, the statute is
upheld. Traditionally, the test has applied to economic regulation.' 5 '
More recently, the fundamental interest test has developed, in
which the court weighs "the benefits flowing from pursuit of the state's
objective against the detriments resulting from the impairment of a
basic personal interest."' 52 The fundamental interest test may be trig"' by a
gered 53
suspect legislative classification, such as one based on
5
race,' 4 or by impingement of a fundamental interest, such as the right
to vote'55 or the right to travel.'56 If the fundamental interest is brought
to bear upon a legislative enactment, the state must show the existence
of a compelling interest justifying the enactment, 5 7 and that the statutory bounds are drawn as precisely as possible.'58
The Supreme Court has never held that the right to freedom or the
right of privacy is a fundamental interest under the equal protection
clause; even if it is assumed that a statute restricting the rights of the
criminally predisposed would trigger the fundamental interest test, the
clause provides no protection for those affected by a well-drafted statute. The focus of equal protection is upon state needs, not the individual's. The protection of society from a dangerous individual obviously
would be considered a compelling interest. Thus, so long as the statute
affects only those identified as members of class X and therefore dangerous, a court would be unlikely to find that the statute violates the
equal protection clause. It follows, of course, that if the statute satisfies
the stricter fundamental interest test it automatically would satisfy the
rational relationship standard. Thus, the equal protection clause provides no protection in a due process sense; no conduct-regulating legislation is prohibited-although a legislative enactment impinges fundamental individual interests, it may be justified by a compelling state
interest.
III.

CONCLUSION

Three different aspects of governmental intrusion on individuals
identified as members of class X have been examined. No absolute
151. E.g., Morey v. Doud, 334 U.S. 437 (1957); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1941).
152. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 150, at 1132.
153. 25 VAND. L. REV. 180, 183 (1972).
154. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
155. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
156. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
157. See cases cited note 156 supra, in which states failed to show a compelling state interest.
158. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,supra note 150, at 1132.
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prohibitions on the power of the state to restrict the liberty of X individuals were found; indeed, the opposite is true-the only restrictions on
state power result from technical quirks. At the level of surveillance,
after mass testing and identification of X individuals, the fourth amendment's right of privacy might prohibit continuous surveillance, since the
surveillance would not be based upon probable cause, would not be
limited in time, and would not be specific concerning the evidence
sought. There is no certainty that statutory surveillance would violate
the fourth amendment, however; since the purpose is entirely different
from normal search statutes, the limiting Berger precedent'59 is distinguishable.
At the other two levels of governmental intrusion, the picture is
even bleaker. No precedent exists that clearly invalidates mass testing
to identify X victims or to prevent their incarceration. Identification
procedures such as fingerprinting and blood testing regularly have prevailed as supporting the state's interest-an interest paramount to any
individual's. Although these cases have not involved mass testing, the
constitutional considerations should be similar, since people who have
never been convicted of a crime-suspects later acquitted and applicants
for government-regulated employment-are subject to the same identification procedures.
Incarceration is the most drastic proposed governmental control.
Constitutional challenges to the validity of incarcerating the mentally
ill and sexual psychopaths have been eminently unsuccessful. Incarceration statutes are even more frightening when it is realized that as long
ago as 1953 it was observed that "the old, those with criminal records,
juvenile delinquents, sexual deviates, alcoholics, and drug addicts" are
most likely to be incarcerated wrongfully under statutes regulating the
mentally ill."' Furthermore, statutes that shock one's conscience by
such effects as forcing mentally deficient persons to choose between
lifetime incarceration and sterilization have withstood constitutional
attack, and evidence showing the lack of correlation between present
mental deficiency and the likelihood of offspring inheriting the defect
has been given no effect.
It is possible that if the figures assumed for the hypothetical class
X were changed, a different outcome would obtain. For instance, if the
likelihood that any individual in the general population will commit a
violent act is five percent and the probability for class X members is
seven rather than 25 percent, a court might be more easily convinced
159.
160.

See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274, 294 (1953).
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that incarceration lacks a rational relationship to preventing crime-no
one could argue that crime should be prevented by confining everyone.
Nevertheless, arguments that incarceration is not necessary in all cases
have not been successful. Indeed, even the least restrictive alternative
doctrine has been ignored at times.
The principles of the ninth amendment and substantive due process
do provide the necessary constitutional tools to fashion protection for
the members of class X. The individual's due process right could be
construed to require that the state prove that he, as an individual, and
not just a member of class X, is likely to act in a violent manner in order
to justify incarceration. If the state were unable to offer proof of such
a nature, however, it seems unlikely that a court would find the individual's right paramount to society's interest. If the individual prevailed,
the gates of mental institutions would be forced open, and a statute
restricting the members of class X through surveillance or incarceration
would fall.
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